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Abstract

vided in a letter and sent to users, e.g., Nordea Bank in Finland. Then users may also have to refer to the letter when
typing the passwords during authentication process, which
is both cumbersome and vulnerable to observation with hidden cameras. Thus the development of a secure authentication scheme that the general public can easily use is urgently
needed.

Securely authenticating a human user without assistance
from any auxiliary device in the presence of powerful passive adversaries is an important and challenging problem.
Passive adversaries are those that can passively monitor,
intercept, and analyze every part of the authentication procedure, except for an initial secret shared between the user
and the server. In this paper, we propose a new secure authentication scheme called Predicate-based Authentication
Service (PAS). In this scheme, for the ﬁrst time, the concept
of a predicate is introduced for authentication. We conduct
analysis on the proposed scheme and implement its prototype system. Our analytical data and experimental data illustrate that the PAS scheme can simultaneously achieve a
desired level of security and user friendliness.

1.1

In this paper, we address the issue of how a human user
can securely authenticate himself to a server in the presence
of powerful passive adversaries without assistance from any
auxiliary device.
Attack model: powerful passive adversaries. By powerful, we mean adversaries that can monitor, intercept and
analyze each part of the authentication procedure (i.e., all
the inputs and outputs of the authentication process), except for an initial secret pre-shared between the user and
the server. By passive, we consider adversaries that do not
disrupt the authentication process or change or create new
content transferred during the process. The common goal
of these adversaries is to subsequently impersonate the valid
user later on. We comment that this attack model is stronger
than “shoulder surﬁng”. Concealed input, e.g., ﬁngerprints,
can successfully defend against shoulder surﬁng, but there
is no strong defense against our attack model, where the ﬁngerprint could be recorded.
User constraint: no auxiliary devices. In this paper, we
focus on the design of authentication procedures that can be
accomplished by most human users without help from any
auxiliary device. This constraint is important in a practical sense, and also raises signiﬁcant design challenges. We
notice there are many interesting works in which users authenticate themselves with the assistance of extra devices,

1 Introduction
Authenticating the identity of a human user to a server is
critical in security. While it is reasonable to assume that secrets initially shared between a user and a server were done
so securely, subsequent authentication may be conducted in
malicious environments, which could expose secrets to adversaries for malicious impersonation later on. Some typical
instances have been reported in [5], [6] and [7]. The signiﬁcance of this issue arises from the recent dual trends of
increasingly mobile users and rapidly-advancing hardware
and software technologies that the malicious can exploit.
One natural approach that can be used in untrustworthy
environments is one-time passwords. However, they are
generally difﬁcult to memorize. Users may have to store
them in or generate them with some auxiliary device (e.g.,
cell phones or one-time password generators) that is vulnerable to theft. In some cases, one-time passwords are pro1063-9527/08 $25.00 © 2008 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/ACSAC.2008.23

Problem Statement
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The second approach, increasing the secret space, is also
difﬁcult. We must then address the challenge of limited human memory capacity and the desired huge secret space. It
is challenging for humans to memorize a secret with high
entropy, and consequently, very little work follows this direction. To overcome this challenge, existing work requires
extensive training that lasts at least a few days, or even
months. It is nontrivial to design an authentication scheme
that does not require extensive training time.

e.g., [3, 14–16, 18–20]. The major problems with these devices are production and distribution costs, sensitivity to
theft and loss, and the inconvenience of carrying them.
Design goal: secure authentication. By secure authentication, our objective is to protect users from malicious
impersonation after the authentication procedure has been
successfully accomplished in the presence of powerful passive adversaries. Clearly, authentication methods based on
a ﬁxed input as the password for every login attempt cannot
achieve this.

1.2

1.3

Challenges

State Of The Art

Although the problem has been studied for over ten
years, to date existing solutions are far from usable. There
is some pioneering and inspiring work that aims to decrease
information leakage. Matsumoto and Imai in [10], Wang
et. al. in [25] , and Matsumoto in [11] proposed solutions
based on vector computation. Hopper et. al. in [4] proposed
a scheme based on a conjectured hard problem—learning
parity in the presence of noise. One major downside of this
work is that the required user computation is too difﬁcult to
perform without an auxiliary device. For instance, it is reported only 10% of users can handle the approach in [4]. In
an attempt to increase the secret space, in [23], Weinshall
et. al. propose a scheme in which a user selects between
100 and 200 pictures from a set of 20,000 pictures as the
one-time secret that is recognized for subsequent authentication sessions. However, this approach requires approximately three months of training time to remember such a
large amount of information. In 2006, Weinshall proposed
an interesting scheme in [24]. In this solution, a user memorizes 30 pictures out of 80 pictures as the secret. During
one round for an authentication session, the server randomly
displays some pictures on the screen in a tabular form. According to the positions of the pictures on the table, the user
follows a rigorous protocol to discover a number, which is
the password. The process continues over multiple rounds
before the user is successfully authenticated. Two days of
training is required to memorize the secret pictures and get
familiar with the authentication procedure. In a subsequent
work [2], it was shown that under SAT attack, the secret
memorized in [24] has to be renewed after around six authentication sessions.
It is worthwhile to note that the schemes proposed in [8],
[17], [26] and [27] against shoulder surﬁng attack can also
be used against our attack model. However, these schemes
overlooked SAT attacks in their designs.

This problem’s essential difﬁculty lies in the user constraint, i.e., the authentication procedure should be handled
without any help from auxiliary devices.
To overcome powerful passive adversaries, the well
known zero-knowledge proof-based approaches are natural
candidates. However, zero-knowledge techniques are based
on mathematically hard problems [1]. Since humans’ “computational power” is much less than that of machines, these
approaches are simply too difﬁcult for a user to handle. The
fact that zero knowledge techniques are hard to be applied
here is critical. It implies that information leakage in each
authentication session can be feasibly taken advantage of in
our problem setting. Let the entropy of the pre-shared secret space be denoted by H, and the entropy of information
leakage resulting in secret space shrinking in each session
be denoted by ΔH; inevitably ΔH > 0. After being used
for H/ΔH times, the pre-shared secret will be revealed.
This upper bound of the number of authentication sessions
reveals two facts. First, the pre-shared secret cannot be used
forever since ΔH > 0. That is, the secret has to be renewed after being used for a certain number of authentication sessions. Second, if we want to increase the number of
authentication sessions of a pre-shared secret, we must either decrease the information leakage or increase the secret
space, or both.
The ﬁrst approach, decreasing the information leakage,
is difﬁcult. On the one hand, operations needed to ﬁnish
an authentication session are limited when users’ computational power is constrained. Mathematical operations, e.g.,
modular arithmetic, are difﬁcult for many people, especially
when very large numbers are involved. On the other hand,
powerful satisﬁability solvers (SAT solvers) can easily exploit information leakage. Formally, SAT solvers are logical
cryptanalysis tools [13]. The attacker ﬁrst encodes the authentication scheme as an SAT problem and then uses stateof-the-art SAT solvers to obtain all the possible secrets that
satisfy the responses observed. Note that it is even feasible to encode the U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES) as
a SAT problem [12], and state-of-the-art SAT solvers are
powerful enough to handle problems with hundreds of thousands of variables efﬁciently [21]. Following this approach,
to date there is no secure authentication scheme that the general public can easily use.

1.4

Our Contributions

We design a new authentication scheme called Predicatebased Authentication Services (PAS) following the second
aforementioned approach—increasing the secret space—to
delay disclosure of the secret.
PAS balances security and user-friendliness by introducing a new element into the authentication scheme design,
namely, predicates. A predicate typically is a verb phrase
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template that can be deﬁned: (a) as a property of certain
objects, or (b) as a relationship among objects, or (c) as a
value quantifying certain properties of the object as represented by the variables in the predicate. In PAS, the objects
are characters, and the predicates encompass all three deﬁnitions.
In the paper, we show our PAS scheme can achieve a
desired level of security against powerful passive adversaries. We also validate the user-friendliness and systemfriendliness of our PAS scheme by building a prototype system and carrying out real user experiments. The experimental results show that PAS can be handled by all recruited
users. And it requires no speciﬁc training time and takes
a user less than 10 minutes on average to learn and prepare. This demonstrates PAS has much greater usability
compared with existing solutions under the same problem
setting. The desired features of PAS make it a candidate for
a human authentication scheme that can be rapidly adopted
against powerful passive adversaries for use in untrustworthy environments.

Figure 1. Two challenge tables in a round (shrunk screenshot).

based on the value of I and the secrets, and then use them to
login. The login process is detailed in the following section.
The key difference between the PAS scheme and traditional password-based schemes lies in the separation between secrets and predicates. In traditional password-based
schemes, there is no concept of predicates, and the secrets
themselves are used directly in the login process. Clearly,
such schemes are vulnerable under powerful passive adversaries. In PAS, the predicates derived from the secrets are
further hidden (detailed mechanisms will be presented later)
and can vary from session to session.

The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents PAS working procedure and its design details.
Section 3 presents an extended PAS scheme. Sections 4
presents theoretical analysis and numeric results. Section
5 presents our prototype implementation and usability validation, followed by conclusions in Section 6.

2.2

2 Predicate-based Authentication Service

In this section, we will give an example to illustrate the
whole login process. We use the same example above, in
which two secrets are “23 sente” and “41 logig”. After being given I = 15 by V at the start of the login session, P
constructs two predicates “23e” and “41g”. Authentication
in PAS takes several rounds. In the following, we discuss
the process in one particular authentication round.
For each round, V presents two challenge tables, as
shown in Fig. 1, and one response table, as shown in Fig. 2.
P ﬁrst checks if the ﬁrst predicate “23e” holds or not in two
challenge tables. Noticing there is a character “e” in cell
(2,3) of both challenge tables (case insensitive), P memorizes “Yes Yes” for the ﬁrst predicate. Then, P conducts the
same lookup process for the second predicate “41g”. Since
there is a character “g” in cell (4,1) of the ﬁrst challenge table, but there is no character “g” in cell (4,1) of the second
challenge table, P gets “Yes No” for the second predicate.
Based on what P memorizes above (“Yes Yes” and “Yes
No”), the response can be obtained in the response table
with “Yes Yes” as the row index and “Yes No” as the column index, which is “RM” in this example. After typing the
response, the user is led to the next round.
Such process is repeated for each round. In the different rounds of a session, the two predicates used by P are
not changed while both challenge tables and response table
provided by V will change. P can successfully login only
if P has provided the correct responses for all the rounds in

In this section, we ﬁrst discuss the key concepts in the
PAS scheme: secrets and predicates. We then illustrate the
whole authentication process via an example, followed by a
detailed design of the PAS scheme.

2.1

A Login Example

Secrets and Predicates

In the PAS scheme, the secrets are what a prover P (i.e.,
a user) shares with a veriﬁer V (i.e., the PAS server) during the registration stage. In particular, P shares two secrets with V . Each secret consists of two parts: an integer
that will act as the cell index and a string called the secret
word. For example, two secrets could be “23 sente” and “41
logig”.
In the PAS scheme, predicates are generated from the
secrets. Before P attempts to login, V will prompt for an
integer I asking P to use the I th character in the two secret
words to generate two predicates. Suppose I = 15 and the
secrets are the same as those above. P can construct two
predicates, that are, “23e” and “41g”, in which “e” is the
15th character in the ﬁrst secret word “sente” (characters in
words are counted in a “looped” way) and “g” is the 15th
character in the second secret word “logig”. The interpretations of these two predicates are “there is a character ‘e’
in cell (2, 3)” and “there is a character ‘e’ in cell (4, 1)”,
respectively. To sum up, the secrets are what P memorizes
initially. For each login session, P generates two predicates

435

P . In the example shown in Fig. 1, the set of all possible
symbols is H = {A, · · · , Z} with |H| = 26. We then have
τ = 13 and then from (3) we have β = 1. That is, there
are always 13 different characters ﬁlled in each cell. We
comment that challenge tables can be generated by incorporating the CAPTCHA technology to defeat attackers’ bots
and force attackers to extensively involve human beings for
visually interpreting them.
Note that the construction approach described above
does not take any content information of predicates as input.
This allows the challenge table construction to be independent of the user identity and his secret shared with V . Thus,
the attacker cannot differentiate the secrets of two users by
observing their challenge tables. Furthermore, the challenge
tables constructed by this way have a property stated as follows. Let the predicate used for each session deﬁne a random variable S, and let the result from table lookup deﬁne
a random variable A. Then we have the following Theorem
2.1, which states that, even the adversary knows the answer
of a table lookup, he is not able to tell whether this answer
is obtained by a random guess or by applying any predicate.
We omit its proof due to space limitations.

Figure 2. A response table (shrunk screenshot).

the session.

2.3

PAS Design Details

2.3.1 Challenge Table Design
In each round of an authentication session,  challenge tables are generated by V and sent to P . We ﬁrst show how
these challenge tables are constructed, and then show how
the challenge table number  is decided.
All  challenge tables are of the same size with m rows
and n columns. Thus, there are total M = m × n cells in
each challenge table. Each cell in the tables is ﬁlled with
a certain number of characters. Let H denote the set of all
possible characters that can be put into the cell. Let H  denote the set of characters contained in one cell (H  ⊆ H).
All characters in H  are unique and randomly chosen from
H. We denote the maximum value of |H  | (|A| denotes the
cardinality of a set A) by τ . The value of τ , i.e., the maximum number of characters shown in each cell, is decided
by
(τ − 1)/|H| < 0.5 ≤ τ /|H|.
(1)

Theorem 2.1 In the PAS scheme, for any predicate s,
P r{A = Yes|S = s} = P r{A = Yes} = 1/2.

We now introduce references that can help decide the
value of , the number of challenge tables shown per round.
The value of  is decided by the capacity of human visual
short term memory. When there are p predicates, then each
table will generate p answers, each of which is a “Yes” or
“No”. Consider each such answer as a symbol. There are
totally p symbols that should be memorized by P in one
round before looking up the response table. In psychology,
Miller [9] shows that people’s average short-term memory
capacity is 5–9 symbols. By observing neural activity, Vogel and Machizawa in [22] show in 2004 that the effective
short term memory can be around 4 symbols for a average
people. These studies are valuable when we design our PAS
system to achieve a good usability. In our prototype system,
we use p =  = 2.

In the above equation, the left-hand side is the probability
that one predicate evaluates to TRUE when there are τ − 1
distinct characters in each cell. Similarly, the right-hand
side is the probability that such a predicate evaluates to
TRUE when there are τ distinct characters in each cell. For
each cell, V will ﬁll τ distinct characters in it with certain
probability β, or ﬁll τ − 1 distinct characters in it with certain probability 1 − β. Using τ and |H|, the value of β can
be obtained from the following equation
βτ /|H| + (1 − β)(τ − 1)/|H| = 0.5.

(2)

Such a value of β can guarantee that a predicate evaluates
to TRUE with probability 0.5. By manipulating the above
equation, we have
β = |H|/2 − τ + 1.

(4)

2.3.2 Response Table Design
In each round, one response table is generated by V and
sent to P. Each cell in the table, containing a typeable response, is indexed by sequences of b1 b2 . . . b , where each
bi is a “Yes” or “No” and  is the number of challenge tables in each round. The assignment of “Yes” or “No” for bi
indicates whether or not one predicate is satisﬁed in challenge table i (1 ≤ i ≤ ). If there are p pre-shared secrets,
i.e., p predicates will be generated, then this table will be
of p dimensions. That is, each cell, and thus the response,
will be indexed by p sequences. Fig. 2 shows an example where p = 2. We comment that showing a table with
more than two dimensions is achievable, e.g., a Flash ﬁle

(3)

The value of β will not change after having been computed
as long as the values of τ and |H| are not changed. When
generating the challenge tables, V ﬁrst generates a random
number r for each cell, which is uniformly distributed over
the range [0, 1]. If r < β, V randomly selects τ different
characters from H and puts them into the cell. Otherwise,
V selects τ − 1 characters. Each cell is ﬁlled independently.
After ﬁlling all cells in all  tables, V sends these tables to
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the same value of (i + j) mod 2 where i and j are row and
column indices respectively, and then shufﬂing the columns
and rows randomly. Finally, the response table prevents the
random guessing attack in the response ﬁeld for each session. The probability for successful random guess is 1/2nr
that should be small enough where nr is the number of
rounds in one session.
Response tables are generated by incorporating the
CAPTCHA technology. Any type of CAPTCHA, e.g., character recognition based or image recognition based, can
be adopted as long as the corresponding responses are typeable.

can show a three-dimensional table by automatically showing two-dimensional subtables in it.
The response table is carefully designed to prevent possible information leakage. First, it prevents adversaries from
obtaining the exact value of b1 b2 . . . b after having observed
the input responses. In PAS, there are 2p cells in one response table. The table is ﬁlled by using only 2 responses.
It implies that there are 2(p−1) possible ways to index one
single response in PAS. Thus, the reverse mapping, i.e.,
from a response to sequences of b1 b2 . . . b , will have multiple choices. Second, it prevents frequency skew of appearance of each response. In the PAS scheme’s current design,
each response appears once and only once in each dimension. For example, when p = 2 as shown in Fig. 2, the veriﬁer V ﬁlls 2 different strings into this table in such a way
that the same string does not appear in any single row or column twice. We state our uniformness property in the following theorem. Suppose there is a probability distribution on
the response space R. Thus the response deﬁnes a random
variable R. We denote the probability that the response is r
by P r{R = r}. Similarly, we assume the predicates used
for one authentication session, may follow certain probability distribution, which is decided by the pre-shared secret
between P and V . Let the predicate also deﬁne a random
variable S. We denote the probability that predicate s is chosen by P r{S = s}.

2.3.3 Secret and Predicate Design
The predicate in the PAS scheme takes form of (u, v, h),
where u and v decide the cell position and h denotes a character. The values of u and v are decided by the size of the
challenge tables. To decide the value of character h, in each
authentication session, one index I will be generated by V
and sent to P , indicating which character in the secret words
will be used to construct the predicates. Each predicate index I can only be used for a limited number of sessions that
end up with “login successful,” due to inevitable entropy
decrement. The value of this number, denoted by tmax , is
decided by a variety of system parameters. We defer the
expression of tmax to Section 4.
In the PAS scheme, the predicate is interpreted as “there
is one character h in a cell indexed by row u and column v.”
This interpretation is based on the property of a cell with
ﬁxed location. Compared to other options that may involve
relative positions like “there are two neighboring cells containing character A and B respectively,” the current design
is preferred. It provides the convenience for users to check
the satisfaction of predicates efﬁciently. Instead of looking
though all the cells in the challenge table, users now can
quickly tell the results after they get familiar with the locations of cells they remember.
System friendliness is also considered in our current PAS
predicate design, where the objects chosen are based on
characters. Although general multimedia objects are possible, the characters are generally more light-weight in terms
of manipulation, storage and delivery.
In our previous example, the secret word memorized is
“sente” and “logig”. In fact, a secret word can be constructed in any way as long as the user is comfortable memorizing it without compromising its security. There are plenty
of materials online teaching people how to choose a good
password that satisﬁes the long term memory and security.
One possible way is to create new words that can be easily memorized. For example, the secret word “sentenceyz”,
which has 10 characters, is constructed by concatenating an
English word “sentence” with a short character sequence
“yz”. Another possible way to construct a secret word is by
interleaving two easily memorized character sequences. For
example, the secret word “laobgcidce”, which also has 10

Theorem 2.2 In the PAS scheme, for any response r ∈ R
and any predicate s,
P r{R = r|S = s} = P r{R = r} = 1/|R|.

(5)

We omit its proof due to space limitations. In Theorem
2.2, the ﬁrst part of the equation states that the probability that r is the response, given any s as the predicate, is
equal to the probability that r is the response. That is, the
probability distribution of the response is independent of the
chosen secrets/predicates. Thus, the attacker cannot infer
any information about the secret of prover P by only observing the probability distribution of P ’s responses. The
second equation in Theorem 2.2 states that every possible
response occurs with the same probability in PAS. Therefore, there is no skew in the response distribution that adversaries can exploit. Third, the response table prevents
them from taking advantage of correlation of response locations in the response table. Correlation of response locations can result in attacks with low computational complexity. In the PAS scheme, the locations of responses in
the response table are randomly generated for each round
such that no ﬁxed correlation can be obtained over rounds
by adversaries. Technically, it can be done by two steps. In
the ﬁrst step, let each cell with the same sum of p indexes
have the same response. In the second step, randomly shufﬂe this p dimension-wise. For example, when p = 2, we
have a two dimensional response table. This table can be
generated by ﬁrst ﬁlling the same response into cells with
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entropy decrease. The expression of this number, denoted
by tmax , will be provided in Section 4. When designing the
challenge tables for the extended PAS scheme, we decide
the value of τ following

characters, is constructed by interleaving an English word
“logic” and a short character sequence “abcde”.

3 The Extended PAS

k
k


τ −1
τ
1− 1−
< 0.5 ≤ 1 − 1 −
.
|H|
|H|

In the above section, we illustrated the whole login process in our PAS system via an example, and then presented
the design details for each component in PAS. We comment
that, the various facets of the PAS scheme could be modiﬁed to meet the different demands on security and/ or userfriendliness. In this section, we brieﬂy introduce the extended PAS scheme.
The most important extension is on predicate construction. In our previous example, each predicate has an atomic
term like “there is a particular character in a certain cell”. In
an extended PAS scheme, a predicate can contain multiple
atomic terms connected with ORs (“∨”s). Let the number
of terms be denoted by k. A generalized predicate can take
the form “(u1 , v1 , h1 ) ∨ (u2 , v2 , h2 ) ∨ · · · ∨ (uk , vk , hk )”,
where ui and vi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) are cell indices and hi
(1 ≤ i ≤ k) is a character. A generalized secret then takes
the form as “u1 , v1 , u2 , v2 . . . , uk , vk , S[1]S[2] . . . S[len]”,
where S[i] (1 ≤ i ≤ len) denotes the ith character in
the secret word. At the start of every session, k predicate indices, Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ k), will be generated by V and
sent to P . For example, P memorizes “2345 sente”, where
u1 = 2, v1 = 3, u2 = 4, v2 = 5 and len = 5. At the start
of one session, two predicate indices I1 = 1 and I2 = 2 are
generated. P then constructs a predicate as “(23s) ∨ (45e)”,
and then uses this predicate to check the challenge tables.
Note the number of terms in each predicate k can be adjusted by different users with different memory capabilities.
In the extended PAS scheme, although we can replace
any of the ORs in the above predicate by ANDs (“∧”s)
and add any number of parentheses necessary to generate
other valid predicates, we recommend using ORs as above.
The reason is that using ORs can minimize the number
of characters shown in each cell. This makes our scheme
more user-friendly, since the number of characters shown
on-screen will decrease, as will be the time spent on authentication. This is summarized in the following theorem. Its
proof is omitted due to space limitations.

(6)

Using τ , k and |H|, the threshold value β can be obtained
in the V side from the following equation:
k


τ
τ −1
1− 1− β
= 0.5.
+ (1 − β)
|H|
|H|

(7)

Such a value of β can guarantee that a predicate evaluates
to TRUE with probability 0.5. By reforming the above equation, we have,

  k1 
1
− τ + 1.
(8)
β = |H| 1 −
2
When k = 1, equations (6), (7) and (8) are the same as
equations (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Finally, we note that
Theorems 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 still hold for the extended
PAS scheme.

4
4.1

Security Analysis
Preliminaries

We consider three types of attacks: brute force attack,
random guessing attack and SAT attack. These attacks may
have different attack targets. There are three types of attack
targets in PAS: secret, predicates and responses. The deﬁnitions of attacks and their relationship with the attack targets
are detailed below.
− Brute force attack: The attacker ﬁrst obtains a set of
all possible secrets, and then tries them one by one. Such an
attack does not take predicates or responses as attack target,
since they vary in different rounds.
− Random guessing attack: This attack randomly tries
one possible secret, predicate or response in an authentication session. All three types of attack targets apply here.
− SAT attack: As mentioned in Section 1, SAT attack
is the main threat that efﬁciently takes advantage of information leakage to reveal the secret. Hence, in our analysis,
we assume that the SAT attacker can perfectly use knowledge from previously-observed authentication sessions. In
PAS, only two types of attack targets, namely secrets and
predicates, apply to this attack.
In order to evaluate the security and user-friendliness of
our PAS scheme, we introduce two metrics here.
− Cardinality of attack set: This metric is denoted by
|S|. S consists of all possible values of a target. It can be a
set of secrets, predicates or responses. There are no leads to
further narrow down S except for trying possible responses.

Theorem 3.1 In the extended PAS scheme, τ is minimal
when all the logical connectives in the predicate are ORs.
In the extended PAS scheme, k predicate indices will be
generated by V and sent to P in each authentication session. They indicate the characters in the secret words that
will be used to construct the predicates. These k indices are
denoted by Ii (1 ≤ i ≤ k). To generate Ii , two requirements
must be satisﬁed. First, all k indices must be distinct for one
round. This requirement is to avoid unnecessarily shrinking
the predicate size for each session. Second, each predicate
index, i.e., Ii , can only be used for a limited number of sessions that end up with “login successful”, due to inevitable
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Since tsec
max is the maximum value of t such that security
p
requirement Smin
is satisﬁed under SAT attack on secret,
its expression can be given by reforming the corresponding
formulas in Table 1 as below,

High |S| is desired. |S| = 1 implies the target has ﬁnally
been revealed.
− Average number of successful authentication session
per character in the secret words: This metric is denoted
by T . It is deﬁned as the average number of successful authentication sessions that can be used per character in the
secret words, given that the security requirement is satisﬁed.
T reﬂects the user-friendliness in terms of renewal period.
The longer the average usage time per character, the less
frequently the user has to renew his secrets, and hence the
higher the user-friendliness.

4.2


sec  len
1 Nmin
p
k
)
Smin
≤ [M 1 − (1 −
]pk |H|p·len ,
M
kp

|H|)
sec
= kp(M
· 2−nr tmax .
where Nmin
(k!)p
pre
Similarly, expression of tmax can be given by reforming
corresponding formulas in Table 1 as below,

 
pre  len
1 Nmin
t
k
Smin
≤ [M 1 − (1 −
]|H|
)
M

Attack Set Cardinality

In this section, we provide the ﬁnal expressions in Table 1. Derivations are omitted due to space limitations. We
comment that the only attack taking response as the target
in PAS is random guessing as the response tables vary in
each round. We also comment that the expressions of |S|
for SAT attack are obtained right before secret renewal. This
indicates the PAS scheme masks the real predicates used in
each round very well. Even a SAT attack that makes perfect use of information obtained from previous observation
can only reveal a large set of possible predicates, and hence
the secret, right before renewal. By right before renewal,
we mean the SAT attack has observed all successful authentication sessions the user can have, i.e., the knowledge it
has achieves maximum. The cardinality of S of secrets and
predicates under SAT attack is the smallest in Table 1.

4.3

sec

pre
=
where Nmin

4.4

kp(M |H|)kp
(k!)p

kp

/(k!)p ,

pre

· 2−nr tmax .

Numerical Results

In this section, we ﬁrst give the cardinality of the attack
set S in Table 1 under default parameters. We then evaluate
the sensitivity of average usage time per character T under
various parameters, and point out the working space of the
parameters that can achieve required security. Finally we
compare our PAS scheme with the scheme in [24].
We ﬁrst consider the brute force attack. When the attack target is the secret, the cardinality of S is 2103 under default parameters where M = 5 × 5 = 25, H =
{A, B, · · · , Z} (|H| = 26), p = 2, len = 10 and k = 1. It
is larger than that of the cryptographically strong 260 ∼ 2100
[14]. Note that the size against such attacks can be relaxed
to be 230 when CAPTCHA is incorporated [8], and PAS
actually gives results only after multiple rounds. Our PAS
scheme built under the above setting is clearly secure.
We now consider the random guessing attack. Since
the expressions for |S| when secret or predicates become
the attack target under such attack are the same as those
under brute force attack. We only discuss the case when
responses are the attack target. Under default parameters
where nr = 5 and  = 2, the cardinality of S is 210 . Considering in many applications the server can block the user
after certain number of continuous failed attempts (for instance, in Chase Bank’s login system, the account will be
locked after authentication fails three consecutive times),
this set size is considered enough in many civilian applications. Higher security can be achieved via more rounds at
the cost of longer authentication time.
We then consider SAT attacks. The default value for t,
the number of sessions a predicate index can be used, is
two. Under default parameters, the cardinality of S is still
about 250 when secret are the attack target and still about
210 when predicates are the attack target, under a perfect
SAT attack right before renewal.
In the following, we will evaluate the sensitivity of average usage time per character T under various parameters,
and point out the working space of the parameters. In Fig.

Average Usage Time per Character

In this section, we will derive the average usage time per
character, T . Denote tmax as the maximum number of authentication sessions the same predicate indices can be used
under security requirement, the expression of T can be given
by T = tmax /pk. This is because the predicate indices used
for one authentication session contains p · k terms, each of
which consists of one character. In the following, we show
how to obtain tmax .
As the SAT attack is the most effective one targeting
secrets and predicates, tmax is determined by tmax =
pre
sec
min{tsec
max , tmax }, where tmax is the maximum value of t
satisfying security requirement when secrets are attack target, and tpre
max is the maximum value of t satisfying security
requirement when predicates are the attack target.
r
Let Smin
denote the desired secure requirement (in terms
of attack set cardinality) against temporary impersonation
p
by guessing responses. Let Smin
denote the desired secure
requirement (in terms of attack set cardinality) against pert
manent impersonation by revealing preset secret. Let Smin
denote the desired secure requirement (in terms of attack
set cardinality) against temporary impersonation by revealp
t
ing predicates. Smin
and Smin
indicate the desired space of
possible secrets and predicates under the perfect SAT attack
right before the renewal.
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Table 1. Expressions

Secrets
Brute Force
Random Guessing
SAT

M

pk

M

pk

|H|

p·len

|H|

p·len

of Attack Set Cardinality |S|
Predicates


 len pk
1 N
k
[M 1 − (1 − M
)
] |H|p·len ,


where N =

kp(M |H|)
(k!)p

kp

−nr t

·2

N/A

(k!)p

M (1 − (1 −

len
k

2nr
kp

1 N
|H| /(k!)p ,
) )
M
kp
kp(M |H|)
· 2−nr t
(k!)p

N/A

login for at least 10 times in exactly the same computer that
has been compromised.

5

5 Prototype System and Usability Validation

4

5.1
T

N/A
kp

M |H|

where N =

6

Responses

Prototype System

3

We implemented a prototype system of PAS and carried
out real user experiments to check usability and to explore
the ways to improve it. 1
We set up a web server with Apache Tomcat 6.0 on a
PC with a 2.66 GHz Intel Pentium Core Duo CPU and 2
GB RAM. The web pages and authentication scheme were
developed with JSP (JavaServer Pages) 2.1 and JDK (Java
SE Development Kit) 6.0. In our prototype, the number of
secrets p = 2, the number of terms in a predicate k = 1, the
number of rounds in one session is adjustable from nr = 2
to nr = 5, the number of challenge tables in each round
 = 2, the number of rows in each challenge table m =
5, the number of columns in each challenge table n = 5,
character set H = {A, . . . , Z} and the number of characters
in each cell τ = 13. Figs. 1 and 2 show screenshots of our
prototype. Note that the characters shown in each cell are
sorted, and we color each cell at different location with a
unique background color. This color will not change with
tables, rounds and sessions. Thus, PAS users then are able
to quickly pinpoint the cell where they look up the challenge
tables.

2

1
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16
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20

nrl

Figure 3. The shaded area shows the working space of the PAS
scheme, where the parameter settings of the points on the dotted line are M = 25, H = {A, · · · , Z}, p = 2, k =
r
=
1, len = 10. The minimum secure requirements are Smin
p
t
= 210 and Smin
= 230 .
210 , Smin

3, although the value of nr  should take integers in implementation, here we include fractional values for illustration
purpose. The dashed line illustrates the tradeoff between
average usage time per character (T ) and the number of
challenge tables in each authentication session (nr ), given
that the required security level against SAT attack is satisﬁed. Given pre-shared secret space, the tradeoff stems from
the fact that more tables contributing to the response will
lead to more information leaking that can be taken advantage of by SAT attacks. Thus, smaller value of nr  implies each character can be used for more sessions. However, preventing information leakage is insufﬁcient to build
a strong system. Less information entropy obtained by V
for an authentication session (e.g., smaller value of nr ) increases the risk under random guessing attack. Hence, the
working space, which is shaded in Fig. 3, is decided by
considering both. The points in the shaded area satisfy the
security requirement, but may represent different parameter
settings. Speciﬁcally, any point in the area above the dashed
curve represents a parameter setting that is secure against
SAT attack, while any point to the right of the line decided
by nr  = 10 represents a setting that is safe against random guess attack. Note that under default parameters where
nr  = 10, the number of successful sessions per character
is above 0.5. Thus, with p = 2 and len = 10, the user
can securely use PAS to login for at least p · len · 0.5 = 10
successful sessions before renewal under the same powerful
passive adversary. That is, the user can securely use PAS to

5.2

Usability Validation

We recruited 92 participants with 8 between ages 15–
18, 62 between ages 18–39, 16 between ages 40–65 and 6
between ages 65–69. Each participant was asked to read the
How to Login page provided in our prototype before being
required to ﬁnish login attempts successfully at least once
for each round choice, i.e., at least one successful login for
nr = 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. The results of our real user
experiment validate that our PAS system has much better
overall usability than existing solutions in [4,10,11,23–25].
The experimental results show that PAS can be handled
by all recruited users. We report the average data over all
participants, since there is no salient difference in performance among age groups. For a session with two rounds,
the average time for a successful login is 55.53 seconds;
with three rounds, 66.03 seconds; with four rounds, 75.86
seconds; with ﬁve rounds, 84.23 seconds. More details of
1 Link:
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http://drtcl4.cse.ohio-state.edu/B/ .
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Figure 9. Login successful ratios for ses-

time in untrustworthy environments.

sions with different rounds.

tional password based authentication needs only several seconds, it is acceptable for most people to extend login time
to several minutes in untrustworthy environments. We also
notice that very few people are willing to take more than 5
minutes to login. The results reﬂect the fact that most people are willing to trade small amount of time for security,
and also validate the login time in PAS is acceptable.
The login successful ratios (number of sessions the participants successfully logged in / total number of sessions
the participants tried) for authentication sessions with different rounds are shown in Fig. 9, respectively. We notice there is a slightly decrement as the number of rounds in
a session increases. Overall, they are satisfactory with the
least successful ratio above 90%.
PAS does not need speciﬁc training time before login
process and easy to learn and use. 87 out of 92 (94.57%)
participants consider PAS easy to use.

login time distribution are presented in Figs. 4–7. It is unsurprising that the time needed increases as the round number increases. One observation is that, in spite of 55.53 seconds needed to ﬁnish ﬁrst two rounds, only a small amount
of time around 10 seconds is needed to ﬁnish an extra round.
When the number of round increases from two to three, we
need extra 10.5 seconds on average; when the number of
round increases from three to four, we need extra 9.83 seconds on average; when the number of round increases from
four to ﬁve, we need 8.37 seconds more on average. It
seems the ﬁrst two rounds require more time to ﬁnish. In
fact, 55.53 seconds contains the time used for a user to ﬁgure out which character should be used at the beginning of
each session. Suppose each round costs around 10 seconds,
this “initialization” time of the user for each session then
can be expected to be around 35 seconds on average. Once
the characters are ﬁgured out, they will not change in all the
following rounds in a session. Since the cell locations are
also ﬁxed (with a ﬁxed and unique color in our prototype
system) in all the following rounds, the user will get used to
the procedure, i.e., locating the cell and telling if the character is shown, very quickly, and accomplish it faster with
more practice.

6 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a new concept, the predicate,
based on which we provide the design of new authentication scheme called Predicate-based Authentication Service
(PAS) against powerful passive adversaries. Using analysis
and experiments on our prototype, we demonstrate that PAS
can balance security and usability. As such, PAS is a candidate for a human authentication scheme that can be rapidly

We surveyed the participants about the upper bound of
the login time they prefer in untrustworthy environments.
The results presented in Fig. 8 show that, although tradi-
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International Conference on Security and Management
(ICSM), 2003.
[18] McCune et al. Seeing-is-believing: Using camera
phones for human-veriﬁable authentication, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), 2005.
[19] B. Parno, C. Kuo, and A. Perrig. Phoolproof phishing
prevention, In Financial Cryptography and Data Security
(FC), 2006.
[20] A. D Rubin, Independent One-time Passwords, Computing Systems, 9(1), 1996.
[21] SAT solver competition 2007, http://www.cril.univartois.fr/SAT07/results/globalbybench.php?idev=11
&idcat=61.
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Capacity, Nature, 428, April, 2004.
[23] D. Weinshall and S. Kirkpatrick, Passwords Youll
Never Forget, but Cant Recall, in Proc. of ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI),
2004.
[24] D. Weinshall, Cognitive Authentication Schemes Safe
Against Spyware, in Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), 2006.
[25] C. H Wang, T. Hwang, and J. J Tsai, On the Matsumoto and Imai’s Human Identiﬁcation Scheme, in Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt, vol 921, 1995.
[26] S. Wiedenbeck, J. Waters, L. Sobrado, and J. Birget,
Design and evaluation of a shoulder surﬁng resistant
graphical password scheme, in Proc. of the Working
Conference on Advanced Visual Interfaces, Italy, 2006.
[27] H. Zhao and X. Li, S3PAS: A Scalable ShoulderSurﬁng Resistant Textual-Graphical Password Authentication Scheme, in Proc. of 21st international Conference
on Advanced Information Networking and Applications
Wprkshops, 2007.

adopted against powerful passive adversaries for use in untrustworthy environments.
In our research, however, we also found some limitations
on PAS. First, checking a predicate once generates only 1
bit information, yes or no. This potentially increases the
log in time to defend random guess attacks. One focus of
our ongoing research is to obtain multiple bits output for a
single and easy human operation by extending the concept
of predicate or integrating it into others. Second, we found
that from experiments that people are still prone to write the
secret words down to ﬁnd the ith character. This brings the
concern on security. Furthermore, some participants consider checking tables repeatedly is boring. In our ongoing
research, we are introducing images into predicate construction to further improve security and usability.
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